Chapter 2 – The Four Causes from Metaphysics, Book V,
Aristotle
Aristotle – The Philosopher of This World
Aristotle wasn’t just a philosopher—he was the philosopher for over 2,000 years. Born in 384 BCE, he studied under Plato, tutored Alexander the Great, and basically tried to explain everything. Logic, biology, physics, ethics, politics—if it could be studied, Aristotle studied it. While he learned a lot from Plato, he also parted ways with his teacher in some major ways. Where Plato looked to a perfect, abstract realm of Forms, Aristotle kept his eyes on the real, physical world.
Let’s break down some of Aristotle’s biggest philosophical contributions, starting with his logic and metaphysics.
Metaphysics: What Is Stuff, Really?
Plato said physical things were just shadows of perfect Forms. Aristotle said, “Let’s be real—those Forms don’t exist in some other dimension. They’re in the stuff.”
For Aristotle, every object is a combo of:
- Matter (what it’s made of), and
- Form (its structure, or the way the matter is organized)
So a chair isn’t just wood—it’s wood shaped like a chair. That shape, or form, is part of what makes the object what it is.
He also introduced the idea of essential vs. accidental properties. For example, your hair color? Not essential. Your being a living, thinking human? That’s probably essential. A thing’s essence is what makes it that thing and not something else.
Everything Has a Purpose (Teleology)
Aristotle saw the world as goal-directed. Things don’t just exist—they function. A seed becomes a tree. A heart pumps blood. People think, plan, and act. This purpose-driven view of nature is called teleology (from the Greek word telos, meaning “end” or “goal”). Aristotle’s view influenced science, theology, and philosophy for centuries—especially his belief that understanding something means knowing why it exists, not just how it works.
About Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 2 – The Four Causes
Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was Plato’s student, but when it came to metaphysics, he wasn’t afraid to take a different path. While Plato was all about the world of eternal Forms, Aristotle wanted to get real—literally. He focused on this world, the physical one, and asked: what does it mean for something to exist? How do things come to be? And what explains why something is the way it is?
In Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 2, Aristotle introduces one of his most famous ideas: the Four Causes. Despite the word “cause,” he’s not just talking about what makes something happen (like a cue ball hitting another in pool). He’s explaining the different kinds of explanations we can give for why something exists or changes.
Here they are:
- Material Cause – What something is made of. A statue’s material cause is marble.
- Formal Cause – The shape, form, or pattern something has. The statue’s form is the image of, say, Athena.
- Efficient Cause – The agent or force that brings something about. The sculptor is the efficient cause of the statue.
- Final Cause – The purpose or goal of the thing. The statue’s final cause might be to decorate a temple or honor a goddess.
For Aristotle, you haven’t really explained a thing until you’ve considered all four. He’s especially interested in the final cause—the “why” behind something’s existence. Unlike modern science, which often sticks to material and efficient causes, Aristotle thinks purpose matters too.
This way of thinking became hugely influential in philosophy, science, and theology for centuries. So when Aristotle says there are “many ways to explain something,” this chapter is where that big idea takes shape.
Before You Read
When you ask, “Why is this here?” or “Why did that happen?”—what kind of answer are you really looking for? Do you want to know what it’s made of, who made it, how it works, or what it’s for?
Aristotle thinks that to truly understand anything, you need all of those answers. His “Four Causes” aren’t just for ancient artifacts—they’re a framework for understanding everything from toasters to trees to human beings.
Before reading, try thinking about something ordinary—a chair, for instance. What is it made of? Who built it? What shape does it have? And why does it exist at all? That’s Aristotle’s full package of explanation. Keep these questions in mind as you explore how he lays out this classic theory.
Guiding Questions
- What are Aristotle’s Four Causes, and how does each one explain something differently?
- How does the final cause (purpose) change the way we understand what something is?
- Why does Aristotle think you need all four causes to fully explain a thing?
- How does this approach differ from how we typically explain things in modern science?
So What’s a Human, Then?
For Aristotle, humans are rational animals—creatures defined by our capacity for thought. That ability to reason is our essential function, our telos. Live well = reason well. (More on this in Aristotle’s ethics later.)Aristotle believed that everything—from rocks to people to politics—has a purpose, a form, and a way it ought to function. His big idea? To understand what something is, you have to understand what it’s for.
Metaphysics, Book V, Chapter 2
“Since we are seeking this knowledge, we must inquire of what kind are the causes and the principles, the knowledge of which is Wisdom. If one were to take the notions we have about the wise man, this might perhaps make the answer more evident. We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things, as far as possible, although he has not knowledge of each of them in detail; secondly, that he who can learn things that are difficult, and not easy for man to know, is wise (sense-perception is common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of Wisdom); again, that he who is more exact and more capable of teaching the causes is wiser, in every branch of knowledge; and that of the sciences, also, that which is desirable on its own account and for the sake of knowing it is more of the nature of Wisdom than that which is desirable on account of its results, and the superior science is more of the nature of Wisdom than the ancillary; for the wise man must not be ordered but must order, and he must not obey another, but the less wise must obey him. “Such and so many are the notions, then, which we have about Wisdom and the wise. Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry. But the science which investigates causes is also instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing. And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing will choose most readily that which is most truly knowledge, and such is the knowledge of that which is most knowable); and the first principles and the causes are most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things come to be known, and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes. “That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of the earliest philosophers. For it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at the obvious difficulties, then advanced little by little and stated difficulties about the greater matters, e.g. about the phenomena of the moon and those of the sun and of the stars, and about the genesis of the universe. And a man who is puzzled and wonders thinks himself ignorant (whence even the lover of myth is in a sense a lover of Wisdom, for the myth is composed of wonders); therefore since they philosophized order to escape from ignorance, evidently they were pursuing science in order to know, and not for any utilitarian end. And this is confirmed by the facts; for it was when almost all the necessities of life and the things that make for comfort and recreation had been secured, that such knowledge began to be sought. Evidently then we do not seek it for the sake of any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who exists for his own sake and not for another’s, so we pursue this as the only free science, for it alone exists for its own sake. “Hence also the possession of it might be justly regarded as beyond human power; for in many ways human nature is in bondage, so that according to Simonides ‘God alone can have this privilege’, and it is unfitting that man should not be content to seek the knowledge that is suited to him. If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural to the divine power, it would probably occur in this case above all, and all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. But the divine power cannot be jealous (nay, according to the proverb, ‘bards tell a lie’), nor should any other science be thought more honourable than one of this sort. For the most divine science is also most honourable; and this science alone must be, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities; for (1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better. “Yet the acquisition of it must in a sense end in something which is the opposite of our original inquiries. For all men begin, as we said, by wondering that things are as they are, as they do about self-moving marionettes, or about the solstices or the incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side; for it seems wonderful to all who have not yet seen the reason, that there is a thing which cannot be measured even by the smallest unit. But we must end in the contrary and, according to the proverb, the better state, as is the case in these instances too when men learn the cause; for there is nothing which would surprise a geometer so much as if the diagonal turned out to be commensurable. “We have stated, then, what is the nature of the science we are searching for, and what is the mark which our search and our whole investigation must reach.
About this read
W.D. Ross translation of Metaphysics, chapter 2 was retrieved from Project Gutenberg. This work is in the Public Domain.
